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2 
The theoretical framework of monetary policy revisited 
 
 
Abstract 
The three-equation New-Keynesian model advocated by Woodford (2003) as a self-contained 
system on which to base monetary policy analysis is shown to be inconsistent in the sense that 
its long-run static equilibrium solution implies that the interest rate is determined from two of 
the system’s equations, while the price level is left undetermined. The inconsistency is remedied 
by replacing the Taylor rule with a standard money demand equation. The modified system is 
seen to possess the key properties of monetarist theory for the long run, i.e. monetary neutrality 
with respect to real output and the real interest rate and proportionality between money and 
prices. Both the modified and the original New-Keynesian models are estimated on US data and 
their dynamic properties are examined by impulse response analysis. Our research suggests that 
the economic and monetary analysis of the European Central Bank could be unified into a 
single framework. 
 
JEL classification: E40, E47; E52, E58 
Keywords: Monetary theory; Central banking; New-Keynesian model; Impulse response 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
3 
1. Introduction 
The New-Keynesian model as laid out by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and 
Goodfriend and King (1997) and developed in detail by Woodford (2003) appears to be today’s 
mainstream approach to monetary analysis. As pointed out by McCallum (2010), “it has 
become the bible for a generation of young scholars who will likely dominate monetary 
economics for the next couple of decades”. Requiring only a small number of equations and 
variables, the model has proved very helpful in deriving certain important principles for the 
conduct of monetary policy. However, a notable feature of this model, which is highly debated, 
is that monetary aggregates play no direct role in the transmission of monetary policy to output 
and inflation. Thus, inflation is no longer considered to be “always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon” according to Friedman’s famous dictum (Friedman, 1963, p.17). Given that 
monetary policy decisions are made by most central banks with regard to the interest rate, 
changes in this rate,  by influencing aggregate demand and the gap between actual output and its 
potential level, impact on inflation via the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Interest rate policy, 
no matter whether it is optimal or not, may be thus characterized without any reference to 
monetary aggregates. These are determined from the equilibrium condition in the money market 
as the stock of money balances, which is sufficient to satisfy the demand for money at a 
particular level of the interest rate.  
The importance of monetary aggregates has declined in central bank practice. The 
Federal Reserve already de-emphasized the role of monetary aggregates in its strategy in the 
early 1990s, although arguably this was due to empirical problems that originated from factors 
such as financial innovation, currency substitution, divergent developments in income and 
wealth etc, rather than new theories. An exception to this trend is the European Central Bank 
(ECB), whose monetary policy strategy is based on two analytical perspectives referred to as 
the “two pillars”: the economic analysis and monetary analysis. The former focuses on a short- 
to medium-term horizon and analyzes price developments, which over this horizon are thought 
to be influenced largely by the interplay of demand and supply in the output market. The 
monetary analysis, on the other hand, is important enough to deserve a special consideration in 
the ECB's strategy and focuses on the medium- to long-term link between money and prices. 
However, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy “was often derided by observers as lacking a 
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theoretical foundation” (Blanchard et al., 2010, p.5). For this reason, merging the two analytical 
pillars of the ECB’s strategy would appear to be a quite attractive and rewarding possibility. 
This would require a unified treatment of essential monetary and non-monetary determinants of 
inflation in a consistent framework (Papademos, 2008). Lucas (2007) raised a similar point, 
criticizing the increasing reliance of central bank research on New Keynesian modeling. He 
suggests that New Keynesian models “are formulated in terms of deviations from trends that are 
themselves determined somewhere off stage”. Thus, according to Lucas, these models should be 
reformulated to give a unified account of trends, including trends in monetary aggregates, but so 
far they have not been. In a similar vein, Pesaran and Smith (2011) argued that the long-run 
steady state, around which most New-Keynesian DSGE models are log-linearized, is estimated 
by deterministic trends or by purely statistical methods like the HP filter, a fact indicating a low 
degree of belief in long-run economic relations. It would instead be preferable to use the theory 
to get the steady state, which would give the model transparent long-run properties that offer 
themselves to a theoretical interpretation. 
In this paper, we revisit the New-Keynesian model and examine its implications for the 
role of monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy. Using the concept of static long-
run equilibrium, we show that the New-Keynesian model, including a New-Keynesian Phillips 
curve, an aggregate demand equation and a Taylor rule, is internally inconsistent. In particular, 
when the endogenous variables of interest are real output, the interest rate and the price level, 
the latter is left undetermined, while two of the model’s equations provide long-run static 
equilibrium solutions for the same variable, namely the interest rate.  
 This problem can be remedied by inserting a standard money demand equation (instead 
of the Taylor rule) in the original New-Keynesian model. We confirm that in this modified 
model, real output and the real interest rate are determined from the New-Keynesian Phillips 
curve and the aggregate demand equation, respectively, while the money demand equation 
determines the price level. This model maintains all the desirable features of the original New-
Keynesian macroeconomic system: first and foremost the main structural equations are still 
directly derived from the optimizing behavior of individual rational agents. The model can be 
solved for all three endogenous variables (output, interest rate and price level) using standard 
statistical techniques. Further, the time path of the endogenous variables, as obtained from 
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impulse response analysis, confirms that the modified model possesses the key long-run 
monetarist features, namely (i) monetary neutrality with respect to real output and the real 
interest rate and (ii) proportionality between money and prices  (Abel and Bernanke, 1992).  
Moreover, the modified three-equation model follows Pesaran and Smith’s (2011) 
suggestion in the sense that a static long-run equilibrium is established. Importantly, from a 
policy perspective, this model enables the integration of the two pillars of the ECB’s monetary 
policy strategy, i.e. the economic and monetary analyses. According to the model, consistent 
with the ECB analysis, the main (but not exclusive) short-run influences on the price level come 
from the interplay between the demand and the supply of output but the only lasting influence  
can come from the supply of money. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the original model 
(used as a benchmark for comparison) and the modified model as well as the role of monetary 
aggregates in these models. Section 3 describes theoretically the long-run properties and 
consistency of the models. In section 4 we present our empirical analysis. First, we estimate the 
two models and, subsequently, we examine their dynamics using impulse-response analysis. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Monetary policy: the current debate 
A lively debate has developed recently within the field of monetary economics in the 
context of New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. This 
modeling framework is currently the dominant school of thought, both in academic circles and 
in actual central banking practice. It consists of only three structural relationships and does not 
include a money demand equation or, indeed, any monetary aggregates at all. Nonetheless, 
academic discussions and monetary policy decision-making are often grounded on this basis. 
Christiano et al. (2007) note that “the current consensus is that money and credit have 
essentially no constructive role to play in monetary policy”. 
 
2.1. The benchmark model 
This paper revisits this popular framework with a view to reexamining its characteristics 
and consistency. We first set out the benchmark New-Keynesian DSGE model. Its main 
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equations are derived from the optimization problems of individual economic agents and its 
parameters are explicit functions of the underlying structural parameters of the consumer's 
utility function and the price-setting process, the latter involving nominal rigidities. Rational 
expectations and a forward-looking behavior are also incorporated into the model. Frequently 
cited references include Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) Goodfriend and King (1997) 
and McCallum and Nelson (1999). A standard version of such a model comprises the following 
three equations: 
1 1 2 ( )t t t t t tp a E p a y y ep+D = D + - +         (1) 
0 1 1 1( )t t t t t t yty b b i E p E y e+ += + - D + +         (2) 
* *
1 2( ) ( )t t t t t iti i c p c y y ep= + D - + - + ,        (3) 
where tpD = pit is inflation; pi
* is the monetary authority’s inflation target; ty  denotes output; ty  
is the flexible-price (natural) level of ty ; ti  is the short-term interest rate; 
*
ti  is the sum of the 
central bank’s view of the economy’s equilibrium (or natural) real rate of interest *r  and 
inflation pit1; tep  is a supply shock; yte  is a demand shock; eit is a monetary policy shock, and  
0 < α1 < 1, a2, c1, c2 > 0 and b1 < 0 are parameters to be estimated. With the exception of the 
interest rate, all variables are in natural logarithms. The first equation has come to be known as 
the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). The second is an "expectational" or "forward-
looking" aggregate demand equation (AD). The third is a standard formulation of Taylor’s 
interest rate rule, an increasingly popular tool among central bankers in recent years. 
We briefly recall the intuition behind each of these equations. The NKPC is derived 
from the representative firm’s optimization problem, under monopolistic competition. The 
standard formulation presented above is based on a Calvo-type framework (Calvo, 1983), i.e. 
one involving nominal price rigidities such that, in each period, a fraction of the firms re-
optimize their price, while the remaining firms keep their prices fixed. Price-changing 
probabilities are independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment, i.e. prices are 
                                               
1 See McCallum (2008). In Woodford (2008) the inflation component of *ti  is the central bank’s inflation target, 
while in McCallum (2001) it is expected inflation 1t tE p +D . Whichever definition is adopted, this does not alter the 
analysis that follows. 
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adjusted at exogenous random intervals. According to the specification derived from the above 
optimization problem, inflation depends on how much real marginal cost deviates from its 
frictionless level as well as on what the future inflation rate is expected to be, the latter 
reflecting the forward-looking nature of firms' behavior. As it can be shown that, under certain 
restrictions, the real marginal cost is proportional to the output gap,2 in its most commonly used 
form the NKPC relates inflation to expected future inflation and to the deviation of output from 
the potential level that could have been attained under flexible prices. It is the assumption of 
nominal price rigidities that generates the real effects of monetary policy in the benchmark 
model. 
The AD equation in the most basic model, i.e. that for a closed economy without a 
public sector, reflects the optimizing behavior of the representative consumer and the 
equilibrium in the goods market. It is derived from the Euler equation of a representative 
agent’s optimization problem and relates output to expected future output and the real interest 
rate. Changes in the interest rate brought about by monetary policy affect the real short-term 
interest rate,3 altering the optimal consumption path. Thus, the aggregate demand function 
encapsulates the degree of control over the economy available to the central bank. 
The third equation is a Taylor-type monetary policy rule, which stipulates how the 
monetary policy authority should move the nominal interest rate in response to a divergence of 
the actual inflation rate from its target or of output from its flexible-price natural level. The 
policy action implied by this rule is an upward adjustment of the nominal (and real, under the 
Taylor principle) interest rate in response to inflationary pressures. 
A fourth equation is occasionally appended to the other three, namely a money demand 
(MD) equation such as the following: 
0 1 2t t t t mtm p d d y d i e- = + + + ,        (4) 
where t tm p-  represents log real money balances; d1 > 0, d2 < 0 are parameters; and mte  is a 
money demand shock. However, the exact role, if any, of a money demand equation in the 
                                               
2 See Gali et al. (2001) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). 
3 Assuming a stable relationship between the short-term interest rate and the monetary policy rate, the two terms 
are used interchangeably in this paper. In less basic models, the monetary policy rate influences the short-term 
interest rate, which in turn affects the long-run interest rate on which aggregate demand depends. 
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context of the New-Keynesian macroeconomic model has been and remains a subject of 
controversy. 
 
2.2. The role of money in the benchmark model 
Current analysis often disregards this last equation, considering it as not integral to the 
functioning of the model. Instead, it is viewed as an add-on relationship, which yields the level 
of money balances compatible with the inflation target set by the monetary policy authority. 
Indeed, the money demand equation is seen as superfluous in the sense that it does not affect the 
behavior of ty , tpD  or ti . Its only function would be to specify the amount of money that is 
needed to implement the policy rule (3). Thus, policy analysis involving the above three 
variables could be carried out without even specifying a money demand function. According to 
Woodford (2008), “there is nothing structurally incoherent about a model that involves no role 
whatsoever for measures of the money supply”. The central bank influences the real economy 
only through the interest rate and, given the money demand relationship, it supplies money at 
the interest rate set. 
The question which arises then is whether money could be given a causal or structural 
role in the "cashless" New-Keynesian framework. As Woodford (2003) indicates, there are 
various ways of introducing money into the model without altering its core characteristics. Most 
commonly, it is assumed that  money is used to reduce transaction costs, and therefore it enters 
the household utility function. Under the assumption of separability of the utility function, the 
aggregate demand equation, as derived from household optimization, remains unaffected – 
money does not appear in this equation. Moreover, this optimization yields a standard money 
demand equation such as equation (4). In this way, money has no role to play from a policy 
perspective in determining the rate of inflation, still the money demand equation itself implies a 
long-run correlation between money and inflation. How reasonable is the separability 
assumption and what are the consequences of removing it? With the separability assumption 
lifted, real money balances enter into the aggregate demand equation4 and a causal link between 
money on the one hand and output and inflation on the other is introduced. McCallum (2001) 
                                               
4 Money may also enter the discount factor of the price-setting firms and thus the New- Keynesian Phillips curve, 
see Berger et al. (2008). 
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notes that separability is an implausible assumption and considers as more likely a negative 
partial derivative of consumption with respect to money, implying that the marginal benefit of 
holding money, i.e. the reduction in transaction costs, increases with the volume of consumption 
spending. However, when McCallum tests whether the exclusion of money from the model is of 
quantitative importance, he finds that the magnitude of the error introduced thereby is extremely 
small, a finding consistent with the insignificance of money in empirical studies of the 
aggregate demand equation (e.g., Ireland, 2004; Andrés et al., 2009). This may reflect the fact 
that although money influences the marginal utility of consumption, it is usually needed for 
only a small fraction of transactions (Berger et al., 2008). Thus, the possible effects of money 
stemming from the non-separability of the utility function can be neglected.5 
Turning to the derivation of the equilibrium solution, including that for inflation, 
Woodford (2008) advocates that this can indeed be obtained from the self-contained three-
equation system. He indicates that, as implied by the solution of these three equations, in the 
long run inflation equals its policy target (or its long-run anchor) *p , output equals its natural 
(flexible-price) level y  and the short-term interest rate is equal to sum of the exogenous real 
rate of interest and steady-state inflation (r* + pi*). Consequently, Woodford’s premise is that, 
while monetary policy determines inflation not only in the short run but also in the long run via 
the interest rate, money balances play no role in this process. 
 
2.3. The debate on the role of money 
Several authors have questioned this view, arguing to the contrary that, in the context of 
New-Keynesian models, long-run inflation is in fact determined by the rate of money growth 
alone (see e.g., Nelson, 2003; Christiano et al., 2007; Ireland, 2004). Bernanke (2003) stated 
that the expectational Phillips curve is fully consistent with inflation being determined by 
monetary forces in the long run. Nelson (2008) and McCallum (2008) in particular responded 
directly to Woodford’s critique, arguing in a different direction. Their disagreement essentially 
amounts to a shift of emphasis, rather than an algebraic correction. As Nelson highlights, 
                                               
5 However, Andrés et al. (2009) demonstrate that when one allows for portfolio adjustment costs for holding real 
money balances, this implies a forward-looking character of these money balances that conveys on money an 
important role for monetary policy. Their estimates confirm the forward-looking character of money demand. 
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Woodford perceives the short-term interest rate as an effective policy instrument, even in the 
long run. This may be overrating the central bank’s capabilities and, moreover, does not follow 
from the model’s assumptions. In the steady state, the monetary policy authority has no power 
to affect real variables, despite its continuing ability to affect nominal variables. Hence, 
according to Nelson, the position that the nominal interest rate may be viewed as a policy 
instrument and the third equation as a policy rule, even in the steady-state version of the model, 
is not a tenable one, unless one explicitly explains how the central bank enforces its inflation 
target in the long run. The formal foundation of this argument lies in the fact that the role of the 
interest rate as a policy instrument in New-Keynesian models stems from a short-run deviation 
from monetary neutrality, arising from temporary nominal rigidities. This effect completely 
dissipates in the long run and monetary neutrality prevails. Conversely, open market operations 
do continue to affect the nominal money stock, even in the long run. Hence, in the long run, 
prices move by the same percentage as the money stock, the money demand equation thus 
becoming pivotal in understanding this long-run relationship. 
McCallum (2008) also argues along the same lines, explaining that, when implementing 
monetary policy by means of an interest rate rule, the central bank automatically commits to 
supplying money at a particular average growth rate consistent with the selected target. As 
empirical evidence he cites his own research (McCallum, 2000) in support of the idea that 
narrow monetary aggregates, such as the monetary base, may in fact be superior to interest rates 
as a policy tool. Furthermore, he disagrees with Woodford’s contention that within the New-
Keynesian framework the central bank could control the interest rate even assuming the 
economy is cashless. 
Nelson, McCallum and Woodford debate the necessity of a money demand equation in 
the presence of an inflation rule or, in other words, the exact sense in which money may still 
determine inflation in the long run, given that inflation is directly targeted, and hence defined, 
via the use of the interest rate as a policy instrument in open market operations. To quote 
McCallum (2008), “there is hardly any issue of a more fundamental nature, with regard to 
monetary policy analysis, than whether such analysis can coherently be conducted in models 
that make no explicit reference whatsoever to any monetary aggregate”. Indeed, in view of the 
absence of monetary aggregates from mainstream monetary policy analysis, one may wonder 
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whether something fundamental has been overlooked in this debate and, hence, whether 
something may be gained from examining the long-run properties of the New-Keynesian model. 
Having done so, one could consider inverting the original question and asking instead whether 
there is any need for a policy rule, once a well-defined money demand equation, linking real 
output and the nominal interest rate to real money balances, is in place. In other words, an 
interesting question is whether it may be the Taylor rule that is in fact rendered redundant in 
such a model. It is with this perspective in mind that we reconsider the above benchmark 
monetary policy framework. 
 
3. Theoretical discussion 
The benchmark New-Keynesian DSGE macroeconomic model is set out in equations (1) 
through (3) and repeated in the first three equations in column 1 of Table 1, which presents the 
alternative policy frameworks to be discussed. This small system comprising the NKPC, the 
“expectational” AD curve and the standard Taylor rule appears, at first glance, to be a very 
straightforward log-linear one. Here we discuss the long-run properties of this model that point 
to an internal inconsistency.  
 
3.1. Long-run properties of linear models 
Before discussing this inconsistency, it may be instructive to revisit the key 
macroeconomic concept of long-run static equilibrium. Although estimation and policy analysis 
is more often based on short-run systems, economists should be equally interested in long-run 
properties and the long-run effects of economic shocks. In this paper it is precisely the long-run 
behavior of the benchmark New-Keynesian model on which we focus. We reiterate that in the 
static long-run or steady-state equilibrium all aggregates, be it stock or flow variables, are 
constant over time and, it thus follows, all growth rates are zero. In other words, the long-run 
static equilibrium of a model is obtained by suppressing all time subscripts. Moreover, in linear 
or log-linear dynamic systems, such as the one at hand, the total effects of a shock or, 
equivalently, the total impulse responses, are given by the solution of the corresponding static 
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form of the model, i.e. of the time-invariant form obtained in the absence of time subscripts (cf. 
Hamilton, 1994; Wallis and Whitley, 1987).6  
It is also important to highlight that for a model, i.e. a system of equations, to be 
internally consistent, both its short-run and its long-run static form should be internally 
consistent. With the above in mind, it is straightforward to show that the benchmark model is 
inconsistent in the sense that, with inflation being zero in equilibrium, its static counterpart has 
three equations but only two endogenous variables. In other words, the interest rate appears to 
be defined from two separate equations, rendering the system overidentified. This point shall be 
clearly outlined below. 
 
3.2. Standard solution of the benchmark model 
We first look at what is viewed as the standard treatment of the model. Following 
Woodford (2008), there are three unknowns, i.e. the endogenous variables ty , tpD  and ti , and 
three equations. Hence, each of these three unknowns can be solved for in terms of the 
exogenous variables, to give what is presented in Table 1, column 2, as the equilibrium solution. 
According to this solution, and assuming that the central bank, acting sensibly, will set the real 
interest rate r* in the Taylor rule equal to the average real interest rate -b0/b1 implied by the 
aggregate demand equation, output is equal to its natural level,7 steady-state inflation is equal to 
the policy-determined inflation target and the interest rate is given by the steady-state Fisher 
condition. Indeed, on the basis of this logic, the system is self-contained as regards equilibrium, 
rendering the further addition of a money demand function redundant. To quote Nelson (2008), 
“the money demand equation adds one equation and one unknown, so it can be dropped 
altogether…”.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
                                               
6 Similar conclusions would follow from the analysis of dynamic multipliers, which is known to yield identical 
formulas to those for the impulse responses in the case of linear dynamic systems (see Brissimis, 1976; Gill and 
Brissimis, 1978). 
7 McCallum (2001, pp. 147) is puzzled by the observation that in the steady state the NKPC implies that 0y y- > , 
which violates the natural rate hypothesis. However, he attributes this to a flaw in the usual formulation of the 
model, which, under rational expectations, cannot capture the persistence found in inflation data. 
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3.3. Long-run static equilibrium of the benchmark model 
The above is a very simple -and hence compelling- analysis of the “matching equations 
and unknowns” type (Woodford, 2008). However, in its simplicity, it fails to bring forth that, 
even within the above three-equation framework, one equation is redundant, at least in terms of 
the system’s long-run static equilibrium; that equation is the Taylor rule. Referring to the above 
solution, Woodford (2008) states that the inflation rate is “determined within the system: it 
corresponds to the central bank’s target rate, incorporated into the policy rule”. However, 
following our earlier discussion, it is a misunderstanding that such a statement reflects part of 
the model’s solution. To the contrary, such a statement in itself presupposes the existence of a 
Taylor rule and, thus, imposes the resulting long-run solution for inflation, i.e. that inflation is 
equal to the policy target. In fact, the static equilibrium value of inflation is by definition zero, 
since in this equilibrium the price level remains unchanged. That given, the two micro-founded 
equations, i.e. the NKPC and the dynamic AD curve, suffice for the calculation of the static 
equilibrium values of the two variables ty  and ti  in what is now a two-equation system. By 
suppressing the time subscripts in these two equations we obtain their static equilibrium form. 
For the NKPC, given that inflation is zero, we come to the same solution for output, shown in 
column 3 of Table 1, i.e.: 
y y=             (5) 
By replacing this solution in the dynamic AD curve and setting inflation equal to zero, 
we arrive at the long-run equilibrium for the interest rate: 
*
0 1/r b b= -             (6) 
It should be noted that, in the long-run static equilibrium, the third equation of the 
system, i.e. the Taylor rule, also implies a solution for the interest rate, namely i = r* (see also 
column 3 of Table 1). From this perspective, the benchmark New-Keynesian macroeconomic 
model would now appear to be inconsistent, in the sense that its static version, with inflation 
being by definition zero, has three equations but only two variables. In particular, the interest 
rate appears to be defined from two separate equations, the “expectational” aggregate demand 
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curve and the Taylor rule, rendering the system, in its static form, overidentifed.8 It should be 
stressed that nowhere in this system is the long-run equilibrium price level determined, i.e. this 
model is characterized by price level indeterminacy in the sense of McCallum (2001).9 This 
indeterminacy remains even if, by pure coincidence, the real interest rates defined by the above 
two equations are equal to each other or if it is assumed, as for instance in McCallum (2001), 
that the central bank chooses r* to be equal to b0/b1. 
 
3.4. Modifying the benchmark model: long-run consistency  
Having highlighted and clarified the internal inconsistency of the current monetary 
policy framework in the long run, we can now consider augmenting the system of equations (1) 
and (2), i.e. the NKPC and the AD equations, by a money demand equation. The very simple 
specification of equation (4) is suitable and can be solved to yield the static equilibrium price 
level: 
0 1 2p m d d y d i= - - -           (7) 
                                               
8 An alternative way of presenting the same point is to view the standard three-equation formulation as a special 
case of the more general formulation presented here, i.e. a case where a policy rule is superimposed on the general 
model dynamics and inflation is forced to have a steady-state value of pi* rather than 0. The enforceability of the 
rule relies on the existence of the Calvo-type rigidities embedded in the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. These 
however are present only at a short-run horizon. Consequently, the claim that the Taylor rule’s effects and 
implications can be thought to follow through to the medium- and long-term horizon remains contentious. 
9 The notion of price level indeterminacy used here is different from the one that involves a multiplicity of 
equilibrium solutions in terms of real variables. The distinction has been drawn by McCallum (2001), who 
nevertheless noted that solutions other than the one he defines as the unique minimum-state-variable rational 
expectations solution may be considered as empirically irrelevant. Cochrane (2007), on the other hand, argued that 
the Taylor principle applied to Neo-Keynesian models does not guarantee inflation or price level determinacy 
(defined as the existence of a single solution that is dynamically stable) but showed instead that New-Keynesian 
models are typically consistent with the existence of solutions with explosive inflation rates. This inflation 
indeterminacy, according to Cochrane, means that the New- Keynesian model does not, in the end, determine the 
price level or the inflation rate and one has to resort to other theoretical possibilities. One possibility would be to 
use money as a nominal anchor but, as noted by Cochrane, central banks appear to say that they use monetary 
aggregates as one of their many indicators but not as the key nominal anchor and, moreover, the problem of solving 
the indeterminacy issues with interest-elastic money demand still has not been solved. Thus, Cochrane chooses the 
fiscal theory as the only currently available economic model that can solve the indeterminacy problems. The 
required assumption for this solution is that governments follow a fiscal regime that is at least partially non-
Ricardian. However, Cochrane admits that the fiscal theory does not yet have a compelling empirical counterpart. 
Finally, McCallum (2009a) argued that least-squares learnability advocated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) can 
save New-Keynesian models from indeterminacies (see also Cochrane, 2009 and McCallum, 2009b). Cochrane’s 
(2007) conclusion suitably sums up this discussion: “One may argue that when a model gives multiple equilibria, 
we need additional selection criteria. I argue instead that we need a different model.” 
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This equation is a function of output (equal to its natural level), the rate of interest (equal to the 
natural real rate) and the exogenous money supply. Thus, all variables of interest have now been 
defined in the static equilibrium of this new three-equation macroeconomic model and are 
shown in column 4 of Table 1. 
In summary, all desirable features of the standard New-Keynesian macroeconomic 
system have been maintained, with first and foremost the fact that the main structural equations 
are directly derived from the optimization problem of individual rational economic agents. 
Hence, the appealing features of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve and the dynamic aggregate 
demand curve follow through to this differentiated setup. However, instead of the ad hoc 
imposition of equality between the inflation rate and the target inflation rate in the steady state, 
and the resulting inconsistency problems, we complete the above two-equation system with a 
micro-founded money demand equation. This allows us to define not only inflation, but also the 
price level which prevails once prices have fully adjusted to monetary policy actions and which 
corresponds to the static equilibrium at each level of the exogenously given money supply.10 
Note that, in this context, the monetary authority may use monetary aggregates rather than the 
policy rate as a tool. Hence, our framework is internally consistent and additionally it possesses 
the key properties of monetarist theory for the long run, namely (i) monetary neutrality with 
respect to real output, (ii) proportionality between money and prices and (iii) no effect of money 
on the real interest rate (Abel and Bernanke, 1992). However, these standard monetarist 
properties are derived from a general equilibrium model, which does not require the assumption 
of perfectly competitive markets, as models of the monetarist tradition do. Instead, it is based on 
the assumption of imperfect competition in product markets, where prices remain fixed for 
some time rather than being instantaneously adjusted to reflect market conditions (see 
Woodford, 2009). Moreover, the much quoted proposition that inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon, intended to reflect a long-run property (Nelson, 2003), is 
indeed reinstated within this framework. 
                                               
10 It should be noted that, a comparative static analysis of our model yields the result that for the central bank to 
allow a sustained change in inflation by x percent (as for example does the ECB, with its objective of an inflation 
rate close to or below 2% in the medium term), the money supply must also be allowed to change at the same rate 
ceteris paribus. It also shows that for d1=1, if the rate of money growth is required to be equal to the growth rate of 
steady state output, reflecting e.g. technological change, this would result in zero inflation (cf. Inoue and Tsuzuki, 
2011). 
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On a final note, the proposed modified framework can describe the behavior of the price 
level both in the long run and the short run11. In particular, in the short run, price dynamics are 
determined primarily by the aggregate demand curve and the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, in 
conformity with the ECB’s economic analysis (which applies to a short- to medium-term 
horizon), while in the long run, the price level is exclusively determined by the money demand 
equation, along the lines of the ECB’s monetary analysis (which applies to a medium- to long-
term horizon).  
 
4. Estimation and dynamics of the New Keynesian models 
4.1. Overview of the estimated models and the empirical methodology 
Following the previous section’s theoretical discussion, we proceed to formulate and 
estimate two models. The first, our modified model, comprises the New-Keynesian Phillips 
curve, the aggregate demand equation and the money demand equation. The second, the 
benchmark model, differs in that it uses the Taylor rule instead of the money demand equation. 
The two models are estimated using quarterly US data for the period 1982.Q2 – 2009.Q3 and 
their dynamics are subsequently examined by impulse response analysis.   
All four equations have already been presented, in basic form, in Section 2 as equations 
(1) to (4). The specifications actually estimated extend this basic framework in several ways by 
introducing: (i) deviations from rationality in the formation of inflation expectations, (ii) habit 
behavior in spending (iii) short-run adjustment dynamics in the money demand equation and 
(iv) interest rate smoothing in the central bank rule. These steps add to the realism of the two 
models, i.e. they enable the respective equations to match the dynamics of the actual data 
reasonably well, without impairing the models’ long-run properties. The empirical form of 
equations (1) to (4), respectively, is: 
1 1 2 1 2 ( )t t t t t tp p p a y y epm m+ - ¢D = D + D + - +          (8) 
0 1 1 1 1 1( (1 ) ) (1 )t t t t t t yty b b i w p w p y y ej j+ - + - ¢= + - D - - D + + - +     (9) 
                                               
11 An early attempt to address the issue of price level determination both in the short run and the long run in a 
monetary model can be found in Brissimis and Leventakis (1984). In their study, whose main orientation was to 
examine the monetary approach to the balance of payments and the exchange rate, the price level is determined in 
the short run primarily by demand and supply in the output market and in the long run exclusively by the money 
demand equation.  
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1 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 1 1( ) ( ) ( (1 ) )t t t t t t t mtm p m p d d y i w p w p el l l- - - + - ¢D - = - - - + + D + - D +   (10) 
0 1 2 3 1( )t t t t t iti y y i ek k p k k - ¢= + + - + +                              (11) 
 
In equation (8), μ1 = a1w, μ2 = a1(1-w), and w and 1-w are the weights of the inflation rate with a 
lead and a lag respectively in the expected inflation term of equation (1). In equation (9), φ and 
1-φ are the weights of future and lagged output respectively in the expected future output term 
of equation (2). 
Each of the four equations is estimated individually; however, the cross-equation 
restriction referring to the expected inflation variable is imposed on all equations where this 
variable enters. Estimation proved a challenging task in view of the difficulties encountered in 
the empirical literature to obtain robust estimates of the parameters of New-Keynesian models. 
Subsequently, we proceed to solve the stochastic models comprising the estimated equations 
(8), (9) and (10) on the one hand and (8), (9) and (11) on the other, in order to consider the 
systems’ dynamic properties. 
 
4.2. Presentation and analysis of the equation specifications  
The first equation is the NKPC equation, which, in addition to the forward-looking 
inflation term, includes one lag of the inflation variable. As already outlined, the theoretical 
appeal of the NKPC stems from the fact that in its purely forward-looking specification it is 
based on the optimal pricing behavior of agents with rational expectations. However, it has 
repeatedly been noted in related empirical research that this theoretically appealing specification 
does not, in practice, adequately capture observed inflation persistence. This feature of inflation 
is often introduced in inflation models by adopting a specification of the NKPC, which, 
deviating from rationality, has both forward and backward inflation dynamics. More 
specifically, following Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali et al. (2001, 2005), a departure can be 
made from the basic Calvo model by allowing for the co-existence of two types of firms. Firms 
of the first type have a purely forward-looking price-setting behavior, as in the basic 
specification. Firms of the second type set their prices using a backward-looking rule of thumb 
based on the recent history of aggregate price inflation. This assumption leads to an extension of 
the NKPC by including a lag of inflation (hybrid NKPC). Alternatively, inflation inertia is often 
introduced through “dynamic price indexing”, i.e. the assumption that a subset of firms set their 
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prices by indexing price changes to past inflation (Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2004) or through 
learning processes on the part of private agents that may be converging to the rational 
expectations outcome in the long run (Brissimis and Magginas, 2008; Brissimis and Migiakis, 
2011).  
The real driving variable included in our specification of the NKPC is the output gap, in 
line with the practice adopted in the majority of the related empirical literature. A strand of 
recent empirical work uses either measures of the marginal cost (see Gali and Gertler, 1999) in 
an effort be more faithful to the original Calvo setup or measures of unemployment (Beyer and 
Farmer, 2003) that draw on Okun’s law. Dupuis (2004) estimates a number of structural models 
of U.S. inflation that incorporate lags of inflation in the forward-looking New Keynesian 
Phillips curve and finds that the hybrid NKPC with the output gap as an explanatory variable 
performs marginally better than the alternative specifications. 
The second equation in our framework (equation 9) is the AD relation. The specification 
to be estimated allows for effects of both future and lagged output. The backward dynamics are 
theoretically motivated in the literature by the need to capture habit persistence. Habits can be 
conceived as either internal to households (where a household’s marginal utility of consumption 
depends on the history of its own consumption) or external to households (where it depends on 
the history of other households’ consumption). Here the AD equation is based on representative 
agent intertemporal utility maximization with external habit persistence as proposed by Fuhrer 
(2000).  
In the AD equation the level of output depends, as in the traditional IS equation, on the 
real interest rate. To ensure internal consistency of our model, the relevant cross-equation 
restriction on the expected inflation variable is imposed in estimation, implying that the weights 
on the forward- and backward-looking inflation terms are constrained to be identical to those 
obtained from the estimation of the NKPC. Additionally, a linear time trend has been included 
in the aggregate demand equation with the aim of capturing the decline in the equilibrium 
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(natural) real interest rate, which has been documented in the literature (see e.g. Benati and 
Vitale, 2007).12 
 The modified model is completed with the specification of the money demand equation. 
We shall estimate a short-run dynamic adjustment equation, which typically features in any 
empirical approach to money demand. In this equation, which is of the error correction type, 
real money balances adjust in response to the deviation in the previous period of real money 
balances from their equilibrium value (error correction term). In our specification the 
equilibrium money demand (co-integrating equation) is a function of real output only. Two 
assumptions underlie this specification. First, there is no rate of return homogeneity in financial 
asset demand. This justifies the inclusion in our empirical money demand equation of both the 
own rate of return on money in real terms and the real opportunity cost of holding money, 
instead of solely the nominal interest rate that appears in equation (7). Second, the two real rate-
of-return variables mentioned previously display stationary behavior and thus are not included 
in the equilibrium relation but are included in the error correction model.13 Moreover, as these 
variables are endogenous, their current level is used in the estimating equation. 
 Finally, equation (11) summarizes the behavior of the central bank using a Taylor rule 
with interest rate smoothing. The main notable aspect of this specification is that, here too, a 
linear trend has been included to capture the declining equilibrium real interest rate, by analogy 
to the one included in the aggregate demand equation. 
 
4.3. Estimation, inference and dynamics 
We use quarterly data for the US economy spanning the period from 1982.Q2 to 
2009.Q3, which excludes the period of non-borrowed reserves targeting in the early 1980s. This 
yields a total of 111 observations. All variables except for the interest rate are in natural 
logarithms and seasonally adjusted. Money supply is M1. The inflation rate is defined as the 
                                               
12 We note that the estimation of equation (9) without the inclusion of a time trend yields a negative value for the 
constant term b0 and, therefore, a negative equilibrium real interest rate (calculated as -b0/b1), precisely because this 
coefficient is picking up the above negative trend.  
13 The real rate of return on money is given by 0- EtΔpt+1 and the real opportunity cost by i- EtΔpt+1. By rearranging 
terms in these two rate-of-return variables, we arrive at a specification which includes the nominal interest rate and 
expected inflation. We do not know a priori the sign of the coefficient on the latter variable. Note that in equation 
(10) we also impose the cross- equation restriction on the expected inflation variable.  
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quarter-to-quarter logarithmic change in the price level. The definition of the variables and 
sources of data are given in Table 2, while summary statistics for all variables included in our 
estimation are provided in Table 3. 
In line with the majority of the empirical studies estimating the benchmark model, the 
parameters of the two models are estimated consistently using single-equation GMM 
(generalized method of moments) subject to the theory restrictions referred to above.14  The 
errors are assumed to be independently and identically distributed following the normal 
distribution. We use the heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) weight matrix 
of Newey and West (1987), which is suitable for the correction of the effects of correlation in 
the error terms in regressions estimated with time series data. The number of autocovariances 
used in computing the HAC weight matrix is selected using Newey and West's (1994) optimal 
lag-selection algorithm. Moreover, we employ the quadratic spectral (Andrews) kernel and 
verify that our results are approximately the same when using the Bartlett kernel. Instrumental 
variables are selected using as criterion the J-statistic. For the NKPC we use as instruments 
(given the J statistic) the first two lags of p and y and the first three lags of i. The set of 
instrumental variables used in the Euler equation includes the third lag of p, the first two lags of 
y and the first lag of i. Further, for the estimation of the money demand the second lags of p, m 
and i are the instruments of choice. Lastly, the Taylor rule is estimated using as instruments the 
second to fourth lags of i and pi, as well as the second and third lags of the output gap. 
All estimates of equations (8) to (11) are presented in Table 4. Our results are broadly in 
line with those in the literature, especially as far as the NKPC and the aggregate demand 
equation is concerned. We highlight the most noteworthy aspects of our estimates. 
Turning first to the NKPC, a positive and significant coefficient of about 0.004 is 
obtained for the output gap. This estimate is somewhat larger than in Cho and Moreno (2006), 
where this coefficient is insignificant, higher compared to Gali and Gertler’s (1999) estimates, 
who find a negative coefficient and similar to those of Shapiro (2008) and Bekaert et al. (2010). 
More interesting is the fact that we obtain a much larger coefficient on the forward-looking 
                                               
14 Several other econometric techniques have been used in comparable research, mainly maximum likelihood 
approaches such as FIML. Galí et al. (2005) critically present the alternative approaches in the context of the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve and convincingly argue that GMM performs at least as well if not better than competing 
techniques. 
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inflation term than we do on the backward-looking one (the coefficient μ1 is estimated at 0.809, 
while μ2 is estimated at 0.109). Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
imply a weight of 0.88 for firms with forward-looking behavior in relation to inflation and a 
discount factor of 0.92, which is lower than the value of 0.99 that is widely used in calibrations 
of the New-Keynesian model. Clearly, our results suggest that the influence of backward-
looking behavior with respect to inflation is quantitatively minor. In other words, the fraction of 
firms that are backward-looking in their price-setting behavior is quite small compared to the 
forward-looking ones.  
Our estimates corroborate those of Gali and Gertler (1999) who, using GMM to estimate 
their hybrid variant of the NKPC, find that forward-looking behavior is dominant, i.e. their 
coefficient on expected future inflation substantially exceeds the coefficient on lagged inflation. 
We quote Gali et al., (2001) who state that “while the pure forward-looking version of the New-
Keynesian Phillips curve is rejected by the data, the hybrid variant with a dominant role for 
forward-looking behavior does reasonably well”.  
As far as the estimates of the aggregate demand equation are concerned, the constant 
term is positive and significant, though only at the 10% level. Notably, the estimated coefficient 
b1 is negative, as expected, and highly significant, its magnitude comparable to analogous 
estimates in the literature that consider robust estimation of the AD equation (e.g., Bekaert et 
al., 2010). In contrast to much of the literature on the output equation (see e.g. Fuhrer and 
Rudebusch, 2004), we do not find evidence of a habit formation process as the coefficient of 
lagged output turns out to be highly insignificant. Thus inertial dynamics are not incorporated 
and we set φ=1 in estimation. We also find a very small but clearly significant coefficient on the 
linear time trend of the real interest rate, confirming the necessity of its inclusion in our 
specification.15 Notably, the AD estimation yields a value for the real interest rate (calculated as 
-b0/b1) equal to 2.5%. This is indeed very close to our priors (cf. Dennis, 2005).  
 Estimation of the MD equation yields statistically significant estimates at the 1% level 
for the coefficients on the error-correction term, the nominal interest rate and inflation 
expectations. The results are intuitive and in line with the broad literature on money demand 
                                               
15 In fact, exclusion of this time trend renders the constant term negative, which implies that it captures a negative 
trend in the data. Of course a negative constant term is at odds with the theoretical predictions for the real interest 
rate. Therefore, inclusion of the trend seems highly intuitive. 
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estimation, suggesting that higher nominal rates are negatively associated with real money 
balances. The long-run income elasticity of M1 demand is 0.5, similar to Ball’s (2001) 
estimates which like our study are based on relatively recent data.    
The estimation results from the Taylor equation are also in line with the literature (see 
e.g., Orphanides, 2003). Here we identify a somewhat higher relative importance of the output 
gap compared to inflation. This finding seems to suggest that, given the developments in 2001 
and the financial crisis of 2007, the central bank places a higher emphasis on output in the last 
decade. In fact, evidence from the earlier period suggests coefficients very close to those of 
Orphanides (2003). It is also comforting that the estimate of the equilibrium real interest rate 
obtained from the Taylor rule once the trend decline has been accounted for is comparable to 
the one obtained from the aggregate demand equation (2.3%). A final interesting finding is that 
monetary policy gradualism is not confirmed by our estimates since the coefficient of the lagged 
interest rate was highly insignificant and thus this variable was omitted in estimation. This 
result accords well with the criticism that large lag coefficients in estimated policy rules may 
reflect serially correlated or persistent special factors or shocks that cause the central bank to 
deviate from the policy rate (see Rudebusch, 2002); the decline in the equilibrium real interest 
rate evidenced in our sample may well account for the lack of interest rate smoothing that was 
found.  
Using the estimates obtained, we proceed to solve both models with the help of Dynare 
and consider their dynamic properties. We first solve the modified model16 and introduce a 
permanent shock of 10 percent to the money supply variable. Since our model is stochastic, the 
permanent shock is introduced through the stochastic term of a first-order autoregressive 
function of the form mt = 0.999999 * mt-1 + ut. Initial values of the parameters of the model 
come from the estimates obtained above.17 For the stochastic simulation procedure we use a 
standard Taylor approximation of the decision and transition functions for the model. 
Subsequently, we generate structural impulse responses for the variables p, y, i and m to this 
shock and present them in Figure 1. It is notable that all variables converge to their theory-
                                               
16 Dynare uses the Klein (2000) and Sims (2002) algorithm for solving the model. 
17 As a sensitivity analysis, we examined whether our results change when using parameter estimates obtained 
directly from the theoretical literature on New-Keynesian monetary models. The pattern of the impulse responses 
remained practically unaffected.  
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implied long-run attractors. Following the expansionary monetary policy shock, the effect on 
output is, as expected, a jump in the short run, followed by a return (albeit gradual) to its long-
run level. Thus, in the long run, output remains unaffected by the monetary policy shock, 
implying monetary neutrality. Similarly, the interest rate declines instantaneously, but remains 
unaffected in the long run, while the effect on the price level is a proportional one. In other 
words, all three fundamental monetarist properties outlined in section 3 are present in our 
proposed system of equations. 
For the benchmark model, the one including the Taylor rule, convergence problems 
were encountered when we introduce a one-period shock to ite¢ . Clearly, the convergence 
problems are due to the fact that the price level in the benchmark model is left undetermined. In 
particular, as is evident from column 3 of Table 1 and the theoretical discussion of section 3, the 
long-run static equilibrium value of output is determined from the NKPC, and the nominal 
interest rate from both the AD equation and the Taylor rule. In contrast, the modified model 
allows determination of the price level through the MD equation and, therefore, it also allows 
obtaining long-run equilibrium values. Notably, the convergence problems persist when using 
different specifications of the benchmark model with the price level as the variable of interest, 
or when calibrating the model with parameter estimates obtained directly from the theoretical 
literature on New-Keynesian monetary models. A plausible interpretation for this failure may be 
that the Taylor rule does not contribute any new elements capable of rendering the benchmark 
model a consistent system. The Taylor rule only reflects the preferences of the monetary 
authorities as expressed in their loss function (plus the structural parameters of the underlying 
model which however do not constitute new elements).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 In this paper we examined the properties of the static long-run equilibrium 
corresponding to the three-equation New-Keynesian model, which has been advocated by 
Woodford (2003) as a self-contained system on which to base monetary policy analysis. This 
model – consisting of a New-Keynesian Phillips curve, an aggregate demand equation and a 
Taylor rule – provides the basis for most DSGE models, which are being increasingly used by 
central banks nowadays. However, the static counterpart of the New-Keynesian model appears 
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to be overidentified in the sense that the interest rate is determined from two separate equations, 
while the price level is left undetermined. We have remedied this problem by replacing the 
Taylor rule in the original New-Keynesian model by a money demand equation. The modified 
model has a corresponding static long-run equilibrium where all three endogenous variables (i.e. 
real output, real interest rate and price level) are consistently determined, while all the 
theoretical features of the original model are maintained. Solution of the modified model and 
impulse response analysis show that – in conformity with its static version – the modified model 
exhibits the key long-run monetarist properties, namely monetary neutrality with respect to real 
output, proportionality between money and prices and no lasting effect of money on the real 
interest rate.  
 Our analysis then re-establishes the role of monetary aggregates in the New-Keynesian 
framework, a role that has recently declined in importance primarily owing to empirical 
problems with the money demand function. In other words, we suggest here that these problems 
do not invalidate the importance of monetary aggregates in the analysis of monetary policy. 
Therefore, we provide a theoretical argument in favor of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy 
that recognizes linkages between money and prices. In particular, in the short run the price 
dynamics of our model are primarily determined by the New-Keynesian Phillips curve and the 
aggregate demand equation, while money demand alone determines the path of the price level in 
the long run. Admittedly, the empirical model analyzed in this paper would need to be enhanced 
along the lines of the DSGE models currently appearing in the literature. This would yield a 
richer policy-oriented analysis and a framework that could further the empirics of monetary-
policy implementation.  
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Table 1 
Monetary policy framework 
Benchmark model with an “add-on” money demand 
relationship 
(1) 
Equilibrium solution of 
benchmark model 
(2) 
Long-run static equilibrium of 
benchmark model  
(3) 
Long-run static equilibrium of 
modified model 
(4) 
1 1 2 ( )t t t t t tp a E p a y y ep+D = D + - +   
0 1 1 1( )t t t t t t yty b b i E p E y e+ += + - D + +    
* *
1 2( ) ( )t t t t t ti i c p c y y ep= + D - + - +  
0 1 2t t t t mtm p d d y d i e- = + - +  
yy =  
0 1/i b b p= - +  
*pp =D= p  
yy =  
0 1/i b b= -  
*ri =  
yy =  
0 1/i b b= -  
 
icyccmp 210 +--=  
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Table 2 
Variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Notation Measure Data source 
Price level p ln(GDP deflator) US Department of Commerce: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Output y ln(real GDP) US Department of Commerce: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Potential output y   ln(natural level of real 
GDP) 
US Congress: Congressional 
Budget Office 
Nominal interest rate i 3-month T-bill Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
Money supply m ln(M1) Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
Notes: The table reports the variables used in the empirical analysis, their notation, the way 
these variables are measured and data sources. Data were downloaded from FRED. 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
 p 4.38 0.20 4.00 4.70 
 y 9.14 0.25 8.68 9.50 
y  9.02 0.24 8.61 9.41 
 i 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.14 
  m 6.90 0.34 6.09 7.41 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics (mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for 
the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
sample covers the period 1982.Q1-2009.Q3 (111 
observations).The variables are defined in Table 1.   
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Table 4 
GMM parameter estimates of the equations of the New-
Keynesian models 
Equation Parameter Coefficient Std. Err. 
NKPC μ1 0.809*** 0.035 
 μ2 0.109*** 0.025 
 a2 0.004** 0.002 
J-stat = 3.26 (p-val. = 0.66) 
AD b0 0.003* 0.002 
 b1 -0.119*** 0.028 
J-stat = 2.72 (p-val. = 0.23) 
MD d0 1.996*** 0.338 
 d1 0.491*** 0.037 
 λ1 -0.062*** 0.004 
 λ2 -0.084*** 0.020 
 λ3 1.989*** 0.420 
J-stat = 1.22 (p-val. = 0.27)  
Taylor rule κ0 0.023*** 0.004 
 κ1 0.038*** 0.002 
 κ2 0.326*** 0.034 
J-stat = 4.65 (p-val. = 0.59) 
Notes: The table reports parameter estimates and standard 
errors from the estimation of Eqs. (8)-(11). The number of 
observations equals 107. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Figure 1 
Response of variables to a permanent 10% shock in money supply 
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